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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein Appellant seeks
reinstatement in the office of attorney general.

Although

not specifically plead by Appellant, it appears to be an
action in the nature of a mandamus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss

Appellant's Complaint in the lower Court.

That motion was

h.eard by the Honorable Jay E. Banks on the 16th day of
July, 1981.

The lower Court granted Respondent's motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, David L. Wilkinson, seeks affir-

mance of the Order dismissing Appellant's Complaint in the
lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case wis disposed of in the lower Court on
a Motion to Dismiss.

There was no evidentiary hearing.

The facts alleged in Appellant's Complaint and attached
exhibits and the exhibit attached to Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss provide the basis for the only facts before the Court.
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The Appellant was hired in the attorney
general's office in November 1968.
Attorney General
(R. 2)

~nder

In 1.973,

He became the Deputy

Vernon B. Romney in

J~nuary

1969.

the Attorney General Career Service

Act was passed [67-5-6

~ ~·

U.C.A. 1953 (as amended

1973)]. Appellant ran for the office of attorney general

in 1976 and in November of that year was elected.
took office in January 1977 (R. 2).

He·

In 1980, Appellant

sought reelection and was defeated in the primary election
by the Respondent.

Appellant discussed with Respondent

or his agent the possibility of being_r. ehired jn the attorney general's -office February 28, 1981.

(R. 3)

Appel-

lant was advised by the Chief Deputy Attorney General on
April 29, 1981 that Appellant's application for employment
had been submitted to the screening

committee but that

his application was not one of the five to come out of
said committee.

(R. 9)

Appellant filed an appeal to the State Merit
System Counci 1 on June 30, 1981.

The appeal to the council

wa s f r om t h e '! Ad v e r s e De c i s i o n o f At t o r ne y Ge n e r a 1 " ( R. 38 ) .

The disposition of that appeal is not part of the record
on appeal.
The Appellant has returned to private law practice.
He is earning "more money than the salary he would be paid
on the staff of the Attorney General 1 s office."

-2-

(R. 4)
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POINT I
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 67-5-11 U.C.A.
DO NOT REQUIRE THE RESPONDENT TO REINSTATE
THE APPELLANT TO A POSITION OF EMPLOYMENT
WITHIN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
Section 67-5-11, U.C.A. provides:
An a t torn e y i n a career .s tat us accept ing appointment to a position in state government which is exempt from the merit provisions
of Chapter 13 of Title 67 shall upon termination
of such appointment or employment, unless he is
discharged for cause, be reinstated in the
career status in the office of the attorney
general at a salary not less than that which
he was receiving at the time of his appriintment,
and the time spent in such other position shall
be credited toward his seniority in the ~areer
service.
Appellant claims that he was an attorney in a
ca re er status po s i ti on i n 19 76 when he ran for and was e 1 e ct e d
to the office of attorney general.

He claims he left career

status when be became attorney general and that he has the
right to reinstatement to career status under· the terms of
67-5-11.
It is undisputed that the Appellant was elected
to the office of attorney general and not appointed.

It

is also undisputed that the position of attorney general is
not a "merit" or "careeer status" position.

Respondent sub-

mits that the lower Court correctly ruled that as an elected
official the Appellant did not come within the provisions of
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67-5-11 since this section applies to those "accepting
appointment to a position in state government" and Appellant did not "accept appointment" to the position of
attorney general.
ln the first portion of 67-5-11, the class
of attorneys entitled to reinstatement is identified.
That class includes "An attorney in career status accepting appointment to a position in state government which
is exempt from the merit provisions of Chapter 13 of
Title 67 ....

11

The classification of those entitled to
-

reinstatement is determined by this portion of-the language
of the statute.

Those falling within the class are those

who (1) had attained career status within the attorney
general's office and (2) left career status to accept "appointment 11 to an exempt position under Chapter 13 of Title
67.

The Appellant does not fall within the clear and unam-

biguous classification as established by 67-5-11 because he
did not accept appointment to hi·s position as attorney
general but ran for and. was elected to that office.

Ap-

pellant concedes that the terms election and appointment
do not mean the same thing.

In his brief he states:

Appellant certainly does not argue that
to "elect" and to "appoint" are the same
thing. Thus he has no quarrel with the
definitions given to those terms by the
Supreme Courts of California and West Virginia quoted at length in R. 19 and 20.
They simply are of no value in deciding
the case at bar.
Appellant's Brief, p. 8.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant takes the position that those officials elected to office are included in Section 67-5-11
not because they fall within the

11

appointed" terminal ogy

but because of the inclusion of the terms
in the statute.

11

or employment"

It must be noted at the outset that no-

where in 67-5-11 does the term "elected" appear.

The

words "or employment" do not appear in that portion of
the statute that establish the class of attorneys entitled
to reinstatement.

The terms

11

or employment 11 are used in

-· t ha t p o r t i o n .o f t h e s t a t u t e wh i c h s p e c i f i e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s
that make the class eligible for reinstatement.

The Ap-

pellant takes the position that the terms "or employment"
must be read in the disjunctive and therefore must include
elected officials.

This position is untenable for the

following reasons.

First, if the terminology "or employ-

ment11 as used in the context of 67-5-11 is to be construed
in the disjunctive to expand the. class of attorneys entitled
to reinstatement, then the class would include all attorneys
who left the attorney general •s office to accept "employment."

For example:

The attorney who left the attorney

general 1 s office to accept employment within the private
sector and then some years later decided he wanted to
return to the attorney general 1 s office would be entitled
to reinstatement.

The office of

t~e

attorney general

would become unmanagable because attorneys in most
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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positions within the office would be subject to being
11

bumped

11

by some attorney who had years before left to

accept other

11

employment.

Clearly the provisions of

11

Section 67-5-11 are not intended to be interpreted so
that such circumstances would result.
the use of the terminology

11

It is clear that

or employment" must relate

to the employment or work done by the person accepting
the appointment.

Second, there is a perfectly logical

explanation for the use of the "or
ology in this section.

emplo~ment

11

termin-

One may accept an appointment

f o r _a s p e c i f i e d pe r i o d o f t i me , i . e--. 2 ye a rs _and then
terminate his employment prior to the expiration of the
term for which the appointment was made.
he may quit before the two years is up.

In other words,
Under these

circumstances the "appointment" period has not terminated
(two years) but the employment engaged in pursuant to the
appointment has terminated because the appointee has
voluntarily ended it.
Finally, if the provisions of 67-5-11 required
the reinstatement of elected State officers, the following
scenario would be possible.

A career status attorney could

leave the attorney general's office, run for and be elected
to the office of lieutenant governor two terms of four years,
then run for and be elected to office of attorney general
for two terms of four years, then when unsuccessful in his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bid for governor expect
general's office.

to be reinstated in the attorney

After sixteen years of employment out-

side the office pursuing a political career he would
expect a position to be available to him in the attorney
general's office.

Respondent submits such construction

of 67-5-11 was never intended by the

L~gislature.

As heretofore ment1oned, the term "election"
or "elected" does not appear in Section .67-5-11.
term "appointment" appears three times.
- appointment and election

not

~re

The

That the terms

synonj~ous

is clear

from a reading of Section 67-19-15 U.C.A. 1953 as amended
1979, wherein i t is provided:
(1)
Except as otherwise provided by
law or rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder for federally aided programs,
the following positions shall be exempt
from the career service provisions of
this act:
(a) The governor, members of the
legislature, and all other elected
state officers;

(b)_ Persons appointed to fill
vacancies in elective positions, employees of the state legislature,
employees of the state judiciary,
members of boards and commissions,
and heads of departments appointed
by the governor, state and local
officials serving ex officio, and
members of state and local boards,
and councils appointed by the governing bodies of the departments.
(Emphasis added.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This section establishes two classes of
exempt positions.

One class is comprised of elected

o ff i c i a 1 s [ 6 7 - 1 9 -.1 5 ( 1 ) ( a ) J a n d t h e o th e r c 1 a s s i s
composed of persons appointed to such positions
[67-19-15(1)(b)J.

The provision in the Attorney

§eneral 's Career Service Act that is the subject of
the instant action only refers to one of these two
categories of exempt positions by providing: "An
attorney in a career status accepting appointment
to a position in siate government

w~tch

is exempt

from the merit provisions of Chapter 13 of Title
6 7 . . . 11 i s e n t i t 1 e-d - to re i ns t a t em e n t .

11, supra.)

( Sec t i

on 6 7- 5-

It should be noted that 67-19-15 is the

replacement for Section 67-13-6 which was repealed in
1979.

The Attorney General's Career Service Act was

not amended to reflect this change.

This provision

clearly references to positions filled by appointment
under 67-19-15(.l)(b) but does not make any reference
to those holding positions to which they were elected
[67-19-15(1)(a)J.

Had the Legislature intended to in-

clude those holding elected positions among those
entitled to reinstatement, surely they would have made
reference to those being elected to office in 67-5-11.
This is particularly true in view of the separation of
the two classes in 67-19-15.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It would, Respondent submits, have been a simple
matter for the Legislature to have drafted 67-5-11 to read
11

An attorney in career status who either accepts appointment .

or is elected to a position in State government which is
exempt from the merit prov_isions of Chapter 13 of Title 67
shall ... be reinstated.

11

The fact that the Legislature

omitted. the language including persons elected to such positions must be interpreted to mean that it

~as

intended not

to include elected officials within the scope of the reinstatement provision of 67-5-11.
Regarding the omission of words in a

sta~ute,

the following pronouncement is made in Sutherland Statutory
Construction:
As said in a leading British case: uTo
discover the true construction of any particular clause of a statute, the first thing
to be attendant to, no doubt, is the actual
language of t~e clause itself as introduced
by the preamble; second, the words or expressions which are obviously by design omitted;
third, the connection of the clause with
other clauses in the same statute, and the
conclusions which on comparison with other
clauses, may reasonably and obviously be
d r a wn . . . .
v·o 1. 2 A, S u t h e r 1 a n d S ta t u t o r y
Construction, Section 46.05, p. 56
(Emphasis supplied.)
11

It is further stated in that same treatise:
Words may not be supplied in a statute
when the statute is intelligible without the
addition of the alleged omission ... where
the omission is not plainly indicated ....
Vol. 2A, Sutherland Statutory Construction,
Section 47.38, p. 173.
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In the instant case the statute is clear and not
ambiguous.

The addition of the word or words necessary to

include attorneys being "elected" to posit:ions in State
government is not necessary to make the statute intelligible,
and the omission of such a provision is not plainly indicated by the statute.

Respondent submits that

wh~re

such

language is omitted from a statute, it must be presumed
that such was intended by the Legislature unless such an
omission would render the statute absurd ~r unintelligible.
The Supreme Court of the St4te of Utah has been
very reluctant to alter the terms of the statutes of this
State and has indicated that such changes, if they are to
be made, are legislative matters and not for the jvdiciary.
In the case of Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 u·.2d 138, 140-141,
4 34 P . 2 d 4 49 ( 19 6 7) , ·the Supreme Co.u rt stated :

... The enactment of the statute prescribing this procedure is the legislative
prerogative. It carries with it the presumptions that it is valid, and that the
words and phrases were chosen advisedly to
express legislative intent. The statute
should not be stricken down nor applied
other than in accordance with its literal
wording unless it is so unclear ·or confused
as to be wholly beyond reason or inoperable ....
As indicated in the above-cited case, the Utah
Supreme Court has refused to read into statutes that which
does not appear in their clear language..

Under the statute,

those career status attorneys that accept appointment to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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positions in State Government are entitled to reinstatement.

That statute does not refer to attor-

neys elected to such position.
add the term

11

The Court should not

elected 11 to the statute.

A further reason for finding that Appellant does not fall within the provisions of 67-5-11
is that this section applies to those
appointment" to an exempt position.
11
••

accept

11

11

accepting

.

Appellant did not

an _appointment, he sought election to the

position and was elected.
Appellant seems to argue that because Section 67-5-13 U.C.A. allows an attorney in career status
to take a leave of absence without pay to participate
in partisan political campaigns as a- candidate that
somehow the provisions of Section 67-5-11 must be
interpreted to mean that if the candidate who has
taken a leave of absence is successful and is elected
to and takes office, his position in the attorney
general's office must be held open for him.

The

pertinent provisions of that section are:
(2) No attorney in a career status
shall be a candidate for any partisan
political office, but upon application
to the attorney general he shall be
granted a leave of absence without pay

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

but without loss of existing seniority
to participate in a partisan political
campaign either as an officer or as a
candidate ....
67-5-13(2) U.C.A. (Emphasis added.)
The above-cited statutory provision clearly
applies only to those wishing to participate in partisan
political campaigns.

This section does not provide for

reinstatement of those candidates who are elected to the
office they seek.

This statutory provisi»n is not limited

to candidates for State office but
offices.

ill partisan political

If Appellant's contention were to prevail and

67-5-13 required reinstatement of candidates who were
elected after their term in office

ended~

it would expand

the class of those entitled to reinstatement to include
those elected to federal office such as senators and
congressmen and those local offices that are partisan
in nature such as county attorney or county commission.
Had the Legislature intended to include attorneys elected
to these po s i ti on s e i t h_e r under 6 7- 5- 13 or 6 7 - 5- 11 , sure 1y
it would have provided for them in the

lang~age

of the

statutes that would not require tortuous manipulation of
the wording.

Since neither the provisions of 67-5-11 nor

67-5-13 provide for the reinstatement of career status

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

attorneys to a position in the attorney general s office
1

who are elected to office, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend for them to be included within
the class entitled to reinstatement.

POINT II
COMPARISONS BET\~EEN STATE "MERIT EMPLOYEES"
AND "CAREER STATUS ATTORNEYS" DEMONSTRATE
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS ARE IN~ERROR.
Appellant argues that attorneys in the attorney
general's

office under the career service program are

given preferred treatment in that they are permitted to
be a candidate for public office and retain their career
status by taking a leave of absence.

Respondent submits

that a similar provision applies to all State merit employees.

Section 67-19-19 provides:
(1) The director of personnel
management shall promulgate rules to
provide for limitations upon the political
activities of state officers and employees covered ~nder career service provisions. These rules shall be drafted and
interpreted to protect the officer or
employee from political exploitation or
abuse and to allow individual state officers and employees the broadest amount
of personal political participation
consistent with loyal service to their
superiors in state government.

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The rules shall incorporate, among
others the following provisions:
(a)

(b) No officer or employee in career
service shall be a candidate for any political office, provided that upon proper
application, an officer or employee-may
be granted leave of absence without pay,
without loss of existing seniority or tenure to participate in a political cal'T:npaign,either as an officer or as a candidat€;
however, time spent during political leave
shall not be counted for seniority purposes
as being in service .... (Emphasis added.)
The provision above quoted closely parallels
the provisions of 67-5-13 in that both allow

e~ployees

in

career status a leave of absence to participate in a political campaign as a candidate.

The provisions of 67-19-19

specificallY indicate that the terms of the statute be
interpreted to favor merit employee political participation.

It must be emphasized that both 67-19-19 and 67-5-13

apply only to candidates for public office and has no application to those elected to public office.
The statutory provision regarding rehiring of
all "career service

11

State employees that parallels the

Attorney General's Career Service Act ·provisions of 67-5-11
is

found in 67-19-17 and provides as follows:
Any career service employee accepting
an ~poi n t men t to an exempt po s i ti on who
is not retained by the appointing officer,
unless discharged for cause as provided by
this act or by regulation shall:

-14-
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(1) Be appointed to any career
service position for which the employee
qualifies in a pay grade comparable to
the employee s last position -in the
career service provided an opening
exists; or
(2) Be appointed to any lesser
career service position for which the
employee qualifies pending the opening
of a position described in subsection
(1) of this section ....
67-19-17 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1979)
(Emphasis added.)
1

As in the attorney general s career service
1

statute, (67-5-11), provision for those elected to exempt
positions is conspicuously absent in the above-cited
statute.

Respondent submits that had the Legislature

intended to include elected officials in the class of
State employees entitled to reinstat~m~nt (~ttorneys or
otherwise) it would have made reference to

11

elected"

officials somewhere in one of these statutory provisions.
One can only conclude that the omission was intended and
that those elected to office were not intended to be ineluded within the reinstatement

~revisions

of either

67-5-11 or 67-19-17.

POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT AN ATTORNEY IN A CAREER
STATUS POSITION PRIOR TO HIS BEING ELECTED
ATTORNEY GENERAL.
Appellant was first employed in the attorney
general's office in November 1968.

He was appointed the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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deputy attorney general in January 1969 and was in

~hat

position at the time the Attorney General 1 s Career
Service Act was enacted in 1973. (R. 2)

He retained that

position until his election to the office of attorney
general in 1976.

Section 67-9-1 U.C.A. (1953 as amended)

provides:
Th e Se c r e ta r y o f S ta t e , t h-e .S ta t e
Auditor, the State Treasurer, the Attorney
General and the superintendent of public
instruction, and the district attorneys as
provided in section 67-7-13 may each app0~nt
a deputy, who may, during the absence or
disability of the principal, perform all
the duties pertaining to th.e.office ....
The appointment of the dep-uty shall _be irn
writing and shall be revocable at the
pleasure of the pr1nc1pal .... (Emphasis
added.)
The provisions of the

statute

abov~-cited

~learly

indicate that the position of deputy attorney general within
t h e a t t o r n ey g e n e r a 1 1 s o f f i c e i s a n

11

e x em p t

person holding that position does so at the
th e a t torn e y genera 1 .

p o s i t i o,rm •

11

11

pleasune

11

Th e
of

I n other wo rd s , he co u 1 d be d ii.s mi s s e d

at any time for any reason or no reason.

The enactment of

the Attorney General Career Service Act 67-5-6

et~·

(Career Service Act) did not repeal the p.rovisions of 679-1.

There are no specific provisions in the Career Service

Act that make the position of deputy attorney general a
career position.

Therefore, Appellant does not qualify

for reinstatement in any event under the provisions of 67-5-11.
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POINT IV
APPELLANT FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY TIMELY, THEREFORE THE
INSTANT CAUSE OF ACTION MUST FAIL.
This Court has held that where administrative
remedi.es are available, they must be exhausted prior to
the initiation of legal action.

In Pacific Intermountain

Express Co. v. State Tax Commission, 7 U.2d 15 at 19, 316
P.2d 549 (1957), this Court held:
In appraising the effect of the statute
relied upon by the parties, there are some
fund amen ta 1 r u1 es which favor the po s i ti-on
of the Tax Commission. Primary among these
is the general rule that before one may seek
a review of the action of an administrative
body, he must exhaust his administrative
remedies and thereby give the agency an opportunity to correct any error it may have
made.
The Attorney General 1 s Career Service Act contains the following provision:
An attorney in a career status who is
aggrieved by a decision of. the attorney general may app~al the decision to the merit
system council as provided for in section
67-13-3, which shall set a time and date
for hearing of the appeal, and the attorney
shall have a right to appear in person or
by counsel.
67-5-12(3) U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1973)
Chapter 13 of Title 67 was repealed in 1979 by
Chapter 139 Section 36 and now appears in the Utah Code as
67-19-1 through 67-19-29.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

In the instant case the Appellant did attempt
to appeal administratively the decision of the attorney
general not to reinstate him.

In a letter dated June

30, 1981 written by Appellant to the Utah State Merit
System Council Appellant stated:
Pursuant to Sec. 67-5-12 U.C.A. 1953,
the decision of Attorney
General David L. Wilkinson not to reinstate
me as assistant attorney general in that
office in accordance with Sec .. 67-5-11,
1953.
I hereby appeal

Would ·you kindly set a time and place
for the hearing of this appeal. lt would
be helpful if this were before July 16th
as the District Court is hearing a related
motion at that time. (R. 38)
As indicated in the above-mentioned letter,
Appellant has made some attempt to utilize the administrative review process referred to in 67-5-12.

The

process as outlined in the statutory review procedure
provides:
No appeal shall be submitted under this
Chapter unless (a) it is submitted within 20
working days ·after the event giving rise to
the appea 1. ...
67-19-24 U.C.A. (1953 as ame·nded 1979)
In the instant cause, giving Appellant the
benefit of the latest possible date of "the event giving
rise to-the appeal," Appellant failed to submit his appeal
within the 20 day time period required by the statute.

-18-
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Based on his allegations final notification of refusal
to reinstate was given to Appellant on April 29, 1981.
(R. 4, 9)

Appellant's first attempt to appeal admin-

istratively the decision which aggrieved him was made by
his letter dated June 30, 1981.
exceeding 60 days between the
appea 1

11

11

There was a lapse of time
event giving rise to the

and the appea 1, a period wel 1 beyond the time

within which said appeal must be submitte9.
Respondent submits that (1) the Appellant is
required to eihaust his administrative remedy prior to
seeking judicial redress, and (2) his failure to timely
seek administrative review is jurisdictional and fatal to
the instant cause of action.
CONCLUSION

The statutory provisions allowing for reinstatement of career status attorneys contained in 67-5-11 clearly
a n d un a mb i g u o us l y a p p ly o n l y. t o t h o s e
to a position in state government."

11

a c c e p t i n g a p po i n t me n t

If, assuming arguendo,

the Appellant had achieved career status within the attorney
general's office, he freely and voluntarily gave up career
status to seek and obtain election to an elective noncareer
status office.

He knew when he became elected his term in

office was four years and if not reelected the position would
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end by operation of law.

Appellant complains that he

gave up his private practice to attain career status.
If this is correct it was, of course, a decision he made
presumably knowing its consequences.

He also gave up

career status to take elective office; again it must
b e p r e s um e d h e k ne w t h e c o ns e q ue n c e s o f s u c h a d e c i s i o.n •
Respondent submits that the lower Court
properly dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint and any one of
the three bases presented to it are sufficient to support
that decision, to-wit:
1.

The statutory provisions (67-5-11) relied

upon by Appellant do not apply to him as an elected office holder.
2.

He failed to gain career status prior to

being elected to the office of attorney general.
3.

He failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies timely.
Respondent respectfully requests this Court
to sustain the decision of the lower Court dismissing
Appellant's Complaint.
DATED this

a/Sf

day of April, 1982.

. c

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that two_ copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed first class,
postage prepaid, to Mark S. Gustavson, Attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellant, 630 East South Temple, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102, this 21st day of April, 1982.
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